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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPTIn their recent study, Zalla et al (2014) explore how regret and disappointment are affected 
in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). The study is motivated by previous indications of ASD co-
morbidity with emotion processing deficits, as well as suggestions that the mechanisms important 
for social cognition (typically thought to be affected in ASDs) may also underlie a variety of self-
reflective cognitive and emotional processes. Zalla et al advance this field of research by 
specifically testing emotional responses and choice behaviour of ASDs in an entirely private 
decision-making context. By so doing, they raise the possibility that emotional processing deficits 
in ASDs may not depend on social cognition, since experiences of regret are caused by, and 
influence only, the chooser themselves. Moreover, by studying regret and disappointment 
specifically, as opposed to responses to negative events more generally, they highlight the 
possibility that particular deficits exist in the processing of counterfactual emotions, i.e. those that 
rely on comparisons between what is and what might have been but which vary in their attributions 
of personal responsibility. 
The study finds that individuals with ASDs lack the ability to distinguish between 
experiences of regret and disappointment, though they show a preserved behavioural impact of 
these emotions on later choice. Zalla and colleagues interpret these findings as reflecting a “failure 
to overtly integrate self-relevant emotional information with inferential reasoning processes” in 
ASDs. Critically, they stress that these deficits can manifest even when these emotions are entirely 
self-reflective – i.e. in decision contexts that do not rely on social cognition. They discuss these 
findings in relation to alexithymia-like diminished emotional awareness, but with covert impacts of 
emotional arousal on behaviour. These findings raise a number of intriguing questions which, if 
answered, may add greatly to our understanding of the deficits associated with ASDs and of the 
mechanisms underlying healthy processing of counterfactual emotions. 
Despite Zalla et al’s focus on an emotional processing deficit, we question whether these 
findings could yet be explained by a purely social cognition account. In order to experience both 
regret and disappointment, one must be able to generate alternative (i.e. counterfactual) states of the 
world, and to take the perspective of the fictive versions of ourselves that experience these 
alternative states. While the ability to take the perspective of others has long been thought to be 
affected in ASDs, less is known about the ability to take the perspective of fictive/counterfactual 
versions of oneself. However, there is evidence that ASDs develop and deploy counterfactual 
inference abilities in an atypical way (Grant, Riggs & Boucher, 2004; Begeer et al 2009).  
Is it possible that the ability for counterfactual thinking is itself impaired in the ASDs? Zalla 
et al addressed this issue by measuring performance on Roese and Olson’s Counterfactual Inference 
Test. Finding no differences between controls and ASDs on this measure, Zalla et al conclude that 
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their ASD participants show intact counterfactual inference abilities. Still, we may question whether 
this is the best test of counterfactual inference in ASDs, given that the test a) relies on an ability to 
judge the mental states of other people, and b) asks the individual to judge the emotional responses 
of others. That ASDs did not differ from healthy controls is, of course, important. However, even 
the controls scored an average of only 2 out of 4 on this test (chance responding would be 1.32), 
suggesting that neither the controls nor the ASDs consistently made counterfactual inferences 
according to this measure. 
Moreover, preserved counterfactual inference does not, of course, imply that typical 
emotional responses to such inferences will also be preserved. Previous studies have found 
developmental delays in the emotional response to counterfactual inference, compared to the ability 
to make inference itself (Amsel & Smalley 2000; Burns, Riggs, & Beck, 2012), suggesting that it is 
possible for the counterfactual inference to be intact but for the emotional response to be absent. An 
ability to experience these emotions can also be separated from the ability to interpret and express 
such feelings appropriately. The latter are thought to be the key impairments in alexithymia, and 
ASD individuals score higher on self-report measures of alexithymia than do healthy controls (Hill, 
Berthoz & Frith 2004; Berthoz & Hill 2005).  
Zalla et al also themselves recognise that regret and disappointment differ most saliently in 
the attributions of responsibility associated with each. While regret depends on the realisation that 
one should have made a different choice, thereby invoking feelings of self-blame, disappointment 
depends only on the outcome being worse than was expected (therefore being 
situationally/externally caused). Is it possible, then, that impaired discrimination of these two 
emotions reflects impairments in attributions of responsibility more generally? By some accounts, 
the representation of mental states (and their causal relationships with externally observed events) is 
necessary for emotional awareness, both of one’s own emotional state and that of others (Hill, 
Berthoz & Frith 2004). “Shared network” hypotheses also advise that the ability to represent the 
emotional states of others shares the same neural mechanisms as those responsible for processing 
one’s own emotional state (Singer et al 2009; and see Nicolle et al 2012). Other studies have also 
shown reduced ability to distinguish between self-relevant and other-relevant information in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex of ASDs (Lombardo, 2010). Since regret depends entirely on our 
ability to mentally construct and take the perspective of our fictive self, and to attribute blame 
internally, any failure to appropriately attribute internal blame for the outcome of one’s own 
decisions (or external causes for the outcomes of events for which we are not responsible) may 
render regret and disappointment indistinguishable. As discussed above, it is important to remember 
that regret and disappointment both rely on taking the perspective of our fictive self. Therefore, the 
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in the ability to appropriately attribute responsibility (i.e. internal versus external), or in the ability 
to distinguish between within-choice and between-choice counterfactual alternatives, rather than in 
the ability to mentally generate and take the perspective of fictive self specifically. 
Since such a social-cognition account implies that regret and disappointment would remain 
indistinguishable at the level of the induced feeling itself, it also predicts impairments at the 
behavioural impacts of these emotions. This is not in keeping with Zalla et al’s findings, however. 
Assuming that the disappointment-inducing and regret-inducing trials were entirely uncorrelated in 
the design of Zalla et al’s experiment, their data suggest that their independent behavioural impacts 
are preserved (i.e. ASDs were able to learn to avoid choices, based on past experience, that were 
most likely to induce regret) and, therefore, that the emotions must be distinguishable at some level. 
The preserved behavioural impacts of regret and disappointment clearly indicate that the deficit 
cannot be explained by a failure to process between-choice information or to make between-choice 
counterfactual comparisons. Note that local processing theories of ASDs (e.g. Happé & Frith, 2006) 
may have predicted a failure to process unobtained outcomes, due to a disproportionate focus on the 
chosen gamble. In this case the necessary condition for regret to be experienced would be removed, 
but Zalla et al’s finding of preserved behavioural impact shows this cannot be the problem. 
Another important finding in demonstrating preserved discrimination of within-choice and 
between-choice counterfactual emotions, at least at some level, is that Zalla et al’s ASD individuals 
experienced greater levels of joy than relief. This finding is intriguing, since it points to a possible 
asymmetry between discrimination of counterfactual emotions in the positive and negative domains. 
Such asymmetries are often observed in studies of reward-driven decision-making in healthy 
participants, yet there the findings are typically that “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Particular aversion to losses in the controls may explain their lack of difference 
between the positive emotions. While it is yet unclear why ASDs report stronger feelings of joy 
than relief (and this effect is the inverse of what is typically expected from regret theory), one 
possibility is that ASDs may place a greater emphasis on outcomes of the chosen gambles, than 
those of the unchosen gambles, but only in the positive domain. 
Zalla et al found impaired discrimination of regret and disappointment by self-report 
measures, but without any clear deficits in the behavioural impacts of these emotions. These results 
may also hint that the impairment is not in the induced emotional response itself, but rather in the 
ability to appropriately identify, discriminate and/or report on them, with the behavioural impact of 
the response perhaps able to sidestep these reflective interpretations. However, it is also possible 
that the intact counterfactual inferences can directly affect behaviour in the absence of any 
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counterfactual emotional response (note that this does not rule out the possibility that unspecific 
negative responses are still induced by the inference). Moreover, studies have shown that 
alexithymic individuals do display behavioural differences from controls on reward-based and risky 
decision-making (Bibby & Ferguson, 2011; Ferguson et al, 2009), meaning that Zalla et al’s 
findings are not consistent with other studies of the diminished emotional awareness associated with 
alexithymia. Since Zalla et al measured only general emotional responses in their self-report scales, 
rather than tapping into reports of regret and disappointment directly or measuring physiological 
arousal, it remains unclear at which stage in the emotional processing stream (i.e. from 
counterfactual inference to induction of the emotional feeling, identification and report on that 
feeling, and finally to the behavioural impact) regret and disappointment will fail to be 
discriminated in ASDs. 
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